Fodor’s Misconstrual of Wittgenstein in the Language of Thought :: Philosophy Essays

Fodor’s Misconstrual of Wittgenstein in the Language of Thought In his book, The Language of Thought, Jerry Fodor claims that i) Wittgenstein’s private language argument is not in fact against Fodor’s theory, and ii) Wittgenstein’s private language argument â€Å"isn’t really any good† (70). In this paper I hope to show that Fodor’s second claim is patently false. In aid of this I will consider Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (243-363), Jerry Fodor's The Language of Thought (55-97), as well as Anthony Kenny’s Wittgenstein (178-202). First I shall summarize Wittgenstein’s argument; then I will examine Fodor’s response and explain why it is fallacious. In my view, Fodor is wrong because he takes Wittgenstein to be a verificationist, and also because he makes a false analogy between people and computers. Anthony Kenny, in his book Wittgenstein, provides a concise summary and penetrating interpretation of Wittgenstein’s so-called â€Å"private language argument† (henceforth â€Å"PLA†). According to Kenny, the basic agenda of the PLA can be summed up in a quotation from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: "Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt only can exist where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said." (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.51) In making his argument, Wittgenstein addresses the belief that the knowledge we have of our own experiences can be expressed to ourselves or others, and that this expression does not assume acquaintance with the external world or other minds. Logically entailed by these beliefs is the idea that there is a private language in which words derive their meani ng by being linked with private experiences. In other words, a subject forms â€Å"internal ostensive definitions.† This means simply that the subject is exposed to and attends to an experience and associates it with a word. For Wittgenstein, this view is mistaken: experience is not private, and words do not acquire meaning by bare ostensive definition. Wittgenstein takes â€Å"private language† to mean a language in which words refer to the immediate private sensations of the speaker in this manner of private ostensive definitions. If a speaker has a certain sensation, she does not necessarily know that sensation only from her own case.